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In order to counteract problems of asymmetric information, electronic markets often implement
reputation mechanisms which allow transaction partners to rate each other’s behavior after trad-
ing. Reputation mechanisms can be used by traders to communicate information about the
behavior of their previous transaction partners to other market participants and can alleviate
the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Dellarocas, 2006). But most electronic
markets do not only facilitate communication about past transactions, they also help potential
transaction partners to communicate with each other before a transaction takes place. Ebay
users, for example, can contact sellers to ask questions about the goods on offer using Ebay’s
email system. Although there has been extensive research on the effects of reputation in elec-
tronic markets (see e.g. Bajari and Hortaçsu (2004) for a summary), little is known about the
role of communication between potential transaction partners. It is surprising that this factor has
been ignored in ﬁeld studies of economic transactions, where several communication channels
are usually available.1
In recent years several websites started operating that allow consumers to buy services via
procurement auctions. Using these websites, consumers can ﬁnd contractors for a variety of
services like the remodeling of their house, the repair of their car or the relocation of their be-
longings.2 This paper studies a German website called MyHammer.3 On the website buyers
describe their projects, select a category and set a starting price. Bidders are then able to bid a
price and buyers can select a winning contractor from among the bidders. As in most economic
exchanges the contracts are incomplete, giving rise to problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard (Akerlof, 1970; Dellarocas, 2006). MyHammer therefore implements reputation mecha-
nisms similar to those used by Ebay and other electronic markets. But unlike Ebay, MyHammer
does not allow private messages to be sent between market participants. Buyers and bidders can
only communicate using an auction-speciﬁc message board. This makes it possible to study the
1A probable explanation is that messages sent between market participants at Ebay, the most widely studied
electronic market, cannot be publicly observed. To my knowledge the only study that controls for the effect of
communication is by Resnick et al. (2006). In their ﬁeld experiment conducted on Ebay the same seller auctioned
off similar items using identities with different reputation ratings.
2A ﬁrst experimental study of bidding in (sequences of) procurement auctions was conducted by Brosig and
Reiß (2007).
3The website can be accessed at http://www.myhammer.de. An English version is available at
http://www.myhammer.co.uk. This study covers auction rules that were in effect in 2007.
4effect of communication on awarding decisions while controlling for bidder reputation using
the publicly available ratings.
In theory, the role of communication by means of cheap talk depends on the nature of the
interaction. As summarized by Crawford (1998): If the interests of buyer and contractor are
similar, communication can be used as a coordination device; if the interests are opposed, com-
munication will not inﬂuence the outcome. In a recent paper Jullien and Park (2010) model
the interaction of reputation and pre-trade cheap talk in markets with adverse selection. They
show that even though buyer and seller interests are opposed in the short-run, there is an equi-
librium where bidders can credibly communicate their supplied quality due to their long-run
reputational motives.
Empirically, a large body of experimental evidence shows that pre-play communication can
dramatically increase cooperation between people in experimental games (see e.g. the survey
by Brosig (2006)). In a related experimental paper Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) study
behavior in a trust game with moral hazard in which a principal decides on hiring an agent, who
in turn decides whether to exert effort. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) ﬁnd that messages
sent from agents to principals lead principals to expect more agents to exert effort and agents
to adjust their second-order beliefs in the same way. Accordingly, principals choose to contract
agents more often and agents choose to exert effort more often than in baseline treatments
without communication.
The results presented here offer supporting ﬁeld evidence for the importance of commu-
nication in market interactions: Bidders use messages to reduce information asymmetries and
buyers (or principals) who can choose among several bidders (or agents) prefer those who send
messages.
2 Data Set
The data set comprises 5,726 auctions for transport and relocation projects with 32,624 bids
from the website of MyHammer which were conducted between January and October 2007.
Transport and relocation projects account for the largest share of auctions in the time span
under consideration. MyHammer’s reputation mechanism allows buyers and contractors to rate
each other after an auction ended. The ratings bidders had received at the time of the auction
5and any additional information they provided in their user proﬁles were available for analysis.
The ratings can be positive, neutral or negative and supplemented by a comment.
In addition, bid prices and messages written by participants on the auction-speciﬁc message
board were used.4 Further information about bidders is included in the regression analyses.5
Table 1 summarizes the main observed variables of bids placed at auctions.
The data set is restricted to projects auctioned by ﬁrst-time buyers and actually assigned to
one of the bidders. To be able to address potential endogeneity issues of communication, the
sample was limited to auctions in which buyers sent no messages and to auctions with bidders
who participated in more than one auction (this covers 65 percent of all auctions). In addition,
the content of 1,950 messages accompanying a subsample of 1,167 bids was analyzed.
Table 1 - Summary Statistics
Variable Deﬁnition Mean Minimum Maximum
(Std. Dev)
Winning Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bid 0.176 0 1
was successful (0.380)
Bid Bid amount 673.009 1 100000
(838.290)
Lowest Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bidder 0.183 0 1
offered the lowest bid amount in the auction (0.387)
Positive1 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bidder 0.199 0 1
has received 1-4 positive ratings (0.399)
Positive2 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bidder 0.187 0 1
has received 5-13 positive ratings (0.390)
Positive3 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bidder 0.192 0 1
has received 14-32 positive ratings (0.394)
Positive4 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bidder 0.191 0 1
has received 33-178 positive ratings (0.393)
ShareProblematic Share of neutral or negative ratings 0.026 0 1
the bidder has received (0.074)
Message Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bidder 0.506 0 1
has written 1 or more messages (0.500)
4In 2007 the message board was meant to be the only way of communicating between buyers and bidders. The
buyer’s contact information was only made available to the winning bidder at the end of the auction. MyHammer
collected a share of the bid from the winning bidder as a fee for transmitting the buyer’s contact information. After
2007 MyHammer changed their rules and now explicitly allowed bidders to transfer their contact information
during the auction for an additional fee.
5This includes the following variables: dummies for company size (1-3, 4-9, 10-20 or more than 20 employees),
a dummy for holding commercial liability insurance (yes or no) and the length of the company description (number
of characters). Furthermore, the distance between the reported area codes was used as a proxy to control for the
geographical distance between the project locations and the bidders.
63 Model Speciﬁcation
To determine which characteristics of a bid inﬂuence the probability of winning a contract, bids
by different bidders in different auctions are analyzed. McFadden’s conditional logit model
(McFadden, 1973) is applied, which assumes an underlying random utility model where buyers






mij + eij,i=1 ,2,...N and j =1 ,2,...,Ji,
where xij is a vector of observed bid-speciﬁc attributes and eij is an unobserved error term. mij
is a dummy variable indicating whether a bidder sent at least one message in that auction. The
probability that bid j is chosen in auction i is
Pr(yi = j)=Pr(Uij >U ik,∀ k  = j).
If, and only if, each error term is assumed to be independently identically distributed with the
type 1 extreme value distribution F(eij)=exp(−exp(−eij)), the probability for bid j to be
selected as a winning bid in auction i is given by
Pr(yi = j)=
exp(β




 xil + γ
 mil)
.
But if bidders who are particularly well suited to a certain project are more likely to send
messages, communication is endogenous and correlated with the error term. To control for
possible endogeneity, the control function approach for choice models suggested by Kim and
Petrin (2010a), Kim and Petrin (2010b) and Petrin and Train (2010) was applied.6 The aim of
this approach is to derive an explanatory variable that conditions on the part of mij that depends
on eij. It is assumed that mij can be expressed as mij = g(zij,δ)+μij, where zij is a vector of
instrumental variables uncorrelated with the unobserved factors μij and eij. Therefore μij and
eij are correlated and eij can be decomposed into eij = E[eij|μij]+ ij. E[eij|μij] is referred to
as the control function f(μij,λ). Substituting it into the utility function together with the error
6Recent applications using conditional logit models include Chen and Moore (2010), Ferreira (2010) and Liu
et al. (2010).





mij + f(μij,λ)+ ij,i=1 ,2,...N and j =1 ,2,...,Ji.
In a ﬁrst step, mij = g(zij,δ)+μij is estimated as a linear probability model. The re-
sulting residuals  μij are then used as estimates for μij in the control function. In the second
step the conditional logit is estimated using the simplest form of the control function given as
f( μij,λ)=λ
  μij. Other functional forms yielded similar results but the resulting models were
inferior according to the Bayesian information criterion. The standard errors are corrected using
bootstrapping as described in Kim and Petrin (2010b).
The approach above relies on ﬁnding instruments that are correlated with the probability of
communicating, but not with the buyer’s utility from the bid. As in Petrin and Train (2010), a
Hausman-type instrument (Hausman, 1997) is constructed: For a bid j in auction i the average
number of messages the respective bidder sent in all other auctions was used in the ﬁrst-stage
regression. As an additional instrument, the number of messages a bidder sent in auctions in
which he did not bid divided by the amount of time the bidder has been registered was included.
4 Results
The estimated coefﬁcients for the conditional logit models described in the previous section
are presented in Table 2. Column (1) reports the results of a simple model including controls
for the bid amount and the reputation ratings: The dummy variables for different levels of
received positive ratings and the share of a bidder’s received ratings that were problematic, i.e.
neutral or negative. The model in column (2) additionally includes the message dummy and
its interactions with the reputation variables. The model in column (3) adds the residual of the
linear probability model as the control function.
8Table 2 - Conditional Logit Regressions for the Success of Bids
Conditional Logit
Independent variable (1) (2) (3)
Ln(Bid) −5.932∗∗∗ −5.913∗∗∗ −5.900∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.194) (0.397)
Lowest 1.218∗∗∗ 1.248∗∗∗ 1.252∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.064)
Positive1 0.559∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.085) (0.125)
Positive2 1.097∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.093) (0.138)
Positive3 1.220∗∗∗ 1.047∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.102) (0.154)
Positive4 1.648∗∗∗ 1.605∗∗∗ 1.629∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.099) (0.154)




Message ∗ Positive1 −0.094 −0.094
(0.124) (0.174)
Message ∗ Positive2 −0.024 −0.031
(0.127) (0.184)
Message ∗ Positive3 0.085 0.086
(0.133) (0.194)
Message ∗ Positive4 −0.079 −0.085
(0.127) (0.198)




McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.402 0.412 0.412
Bayesian Information Criterion -38,597.106 -38,628.085 -38,629.195
N 32,624 32,624 32,624
The regressions include further bidder characteristics. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Standard
errors for model (3) are based on 100 bootstrap replications. ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
9The regression results in column (1) are in line with previous results on reputation mech-
anisms in electronic markets. They show a positive effect of positive ratings and a negative
effect of problematic ratings on the probability of winning. Adding the message dummy and its
interactions in column (2), the effects of reputation ratings remain signiﬁcant while messages
also have a positive inﬂuence on the probability of winning. This effect is not driven by endo-
geneity, as the results in column (3) show. After including the residual the size of the Message
coefﬁcient decreases, but neither its sign nor the signiﬁcance level change.
T a b l e3-A v erage Probabilities of Winning for Model (3)
Message =0 Message =1
Probability 95% CI Probability 95% CI
Lowest =0
No positive ratings 0.037 [0.032, 0.041] 0.049 [0.045, 0.052]
Positive1 =1 0.052 [0.047, 0.058] 0.066 [0.060, 0.073]
Positive2 =1 0.069 [0.063, 0.075] 0.084 [0.077, 0.091]
Positive3 =1 0.070 [0.064, 0.076] 0.086 [0.079, 0.092]
Positive4 =1 0.091 [0.085, 0.097] 0.107 [0.100, 0.115]
Lowest =1
No positive ratings 0.495 [0.464, 0.527] 0.570 [0.548, 0.592]
Positive1 =1 0.591 [0.562, 0.620] 0.663 [0.635, 0.690]
Positive2 =1 0.673 [0.647, 0.699] 0.737 [0.712, 0.763]
Positive3 =1 0.680 [0.649, 0.711] 0.743 [0.716, 0.770]
Positive4 =1 0.762 [0.738, 0.787] 0.812 [0.789, 0.837]
The 95% conﬁdence intervals (CI) are based on 100 bootstrap replications.
Table 3 presents the predicted probabilities of the model in column (3). To facilitate predic-
tions the sample is split up into bidders offering the lowest price in an auction (Lowest =1 ) and
those offering prices above (Lowest =0 ). First, the results highlight the importance of prices:
On aggregate, lowest-price bidders have an average probability of winning of 64 percent while
those offering higher prices have an average probability of winning of only 7 percent. Second,
the results show that bidders can gain from additional positive ratings. On the one hand, the
difference in the probability of winning due to received positive ratings can be as large as 26
percentage points when comparing a not-communicating lowest-price bidder without any pos-
itive ratings to one with 33 to 178 positive ratings (Positive4 =1 ). On the other hand, the
gain for bidders who move from the range of 5 to 13 positive ratings (Positive2 =1 ) to the
range of 14 to 32 positive ratings (Positive3 =1 ) is negligible, as suggested by the overlapping
conﬁdence intervals. Third, in all cases bidders who send messages have a higher probability
10of winning. Lowest-price bidders can increase their probability by 5 to 8 percentage points by
communicating, while other bidders gain between 1 and 2 percentage points.
What do bidders say in their messages? A ﬁrst analysis of the messages sent by bidders in
the subsample reveals that 95 percent of their bids are complemented by the bidder’s contact
information. As Bajari and Hortaçsu (2004) point out in their survey, the anonymity of sellers
is "[p]erhaps the most important source of information asymmetry on online auctions" (p. 469).
In line with this conjecture bidders use messages to reduce the anonymity of transactions. In
addition, bidders try to reduce asymmetric information in two ways: First, they hope to learn
more about the job on offer by initiating further communication (31 percent) or asking about
project characteristics directly (8 percent). Second, they specify their own bids in detail (64
percent). This way many bidders take into account the multi-dimensional nature of the auction,
though there is little variation among the offers in dimensions other than price. Few bidders
explicitly offer more (4 percent) or less (6 percent) than the buyer asks for in the project de-
scription. Further, 25 percent of bids were combined with promises or advertisement messages.
Only 2 percent of bids were sent along with a mention of reputation ratings (of which more than
half were due to one bidder who included a reference to his own ratings in all messages). None
of the bidders in the sample asked about the buyers’ award criteria.
5 Conclusion
This study highlights the importance of communication in market interactions with asymmet-
ric information, revealing that buyers in procurement auctions prefer to contract bidders who
engage in communication and write messages. This evidence from the website of MyHammer
is in line with the theoretical results by Jullien and Park (2010) and the experimental results by
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). An analysis of the message content reveals that bidders use
messages primarily to reduce the asymmetric information associated with transactions. In line
with previous research on reputation in electronic markets the reputation of bidders is shown to
have a signiﬁcant effect on the success of bids. Earning positive ratings increases the probability
of winning, while a higher share of problematic ratings decreases it.
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